Thucydides himself employed a counterfactual approach when discussing the Spartans’ failure to attack Piraeus in 412/411, and this essay might be thought of as an exercise in counterfactual historiography . The argument will proceed as follows. First some preliminary points about the method, nature and possibility of this imaginative exercise will briefly be discussed. The second section poses a question: “what events in the fourth century would have most surprised Thucydides?” Here it will be argued that Thucydides would unhesitatingly cite the astonishing rise of Macedon and the impressive role of Philip as an individual. Thucydides would also have been shocked at rapidity of Sparta’s decline, although perhaps rather less surprised at some of its causes, or at the brutality that preceded it. Thirdly, the fourth century will be considered from the perspectives of some key Thucididyean preoccupations and interests. These include: the Athenian empire and question of how it should best be ruled; military developments and continuities; and some more abstract points about the nature of states’ interactions. The fourth section asks how Thucydides’ views on the fourth century might impact on his assessment of the fifth. Here the issues of Persia and Athenian finances will be discussed.
A number of preliminary points need to be briefly dealt with. First, one of the challenges involved in this essay is that of working out what Thucydides’ views are in the first place, given the relative lack of explicit authorial pronouncements (as opposed to speeches ) in his study of the fifth century . Secondly, given that the cross-questioning of selected oral informants about contemporary events was central to Thucydides’ methodology , he might well insist on being able to make the same sort of inquiries (historia) in order to come to a view on the fourth century, and so the fiction on which this essay is premised should be interpreted in this light. Thirdly, we should expect the nature of Thucydides’ responses to the fourth century have the same focus and to be limited in the same ways as his preceding work: it will be high political history (therefore almost entirely excluding women ), and will omit both divine and moral intrusions, in favour of a more rational approach.
Definitely Thucydides’ first response to fourth century would be to express his astonishment at the rise of Macedon. Thucydides had known Macedon as being large and populous , but fundamentally marginal. He noted that under Archelus some military improvements were made (although Macedon’s defences on the whole remained weak) and territory was consolidated. Thucydides would have noted its lack of constitutional sophistication , and the question as to whether the Macedonians could be considered to be Greeks at all. He would have also seen that even well into the fourth century Macedon seemed to be rather weak: under Amyntas III (393-369) Macedon was unstable, and Perdikkas III (365-360) led a disastrous expedition against the Illyrians in which he and 4000 of his men were killed. Thucydides would surely found himself asking why the Greeks were able to resist the might of Persia but not the military advances of a state that until recently been a third division power.
Thucydides would have explained Philip’s conquest of Greece at least partly with reference to the broader picture of Greek inter-state relations. In the fifth century Greece was dominated by the superpower rivalry between Athens and Sparta . The fourth century saw the rise of new powers, such as Thebes and Thessaly. In general the political landscape was more fragmented and fluid (a tendency foreshadowed by the infighting of Thucydides’ Book Eight ), although some smaller states banded together in leagues as a response to the uncertain environment . The major powers had been weakened economically, demographically, and (therefore) militarily by twenty-seven years of the Peloponnesian War , which meant that there was no one superpower to enforce peace. Warfare, albeit at a low level, was the true constant. Thucydides, with his pessimistic understanding of our unchanging human nature , would have agreed with Plato when he said that “what most men call peace is a sham, in reality all city states are in a state of undeclared war against all others” . Philip of Macedon stepped forward to fill this fourth century power vacuum, doing so by means of territorial absorption, which Thucydides might have contrasted with the hegemonies of the fifth century. The Greek states were too exhausted – financially and in spirit – and too mistrustful of each other to resist. Panhellenism, which had won the war against the Persians in the fifth century, was now absent . The Persians (see below) were otherwise occupied with the revolt of their Western satrapies. As Thucydides knew, the powerful naturally dominate the weak . By being strong enough to enforce the treaty of 337, Philip’s military might finally brought unity to Greece.
Philip’s role as an individual would have been deeply impressive to Thucydides, especially in the light of Macedonia’s modest position at his accession. In the words of Theopompus: “Europe had never produced a man like Philip son of Amyntas” . Hornblower argues that Alcibaides’ and Pericles’ charismatic leadership had allowed Thucydides to develop the view that individual human action can change the course of history . Surely Thucydides would find further confirmation of this idea in the extraordinary achievements of Philip, not to mention in the inherited excellence of his son Alexander?
The second thing that would have astonished Thucydides was Sparta’s rapid decline. Even if Sparta’s victory had owed a lot to Athenian mistakes (not to mention Persian gold), Sparta had become the unrivalled Greek superpower. Sparta was a state that Thucydides admired : he liked its political stability (eunomia) , “prudence” and obedience to law . Kleon had observed of Athens that democracy could not rule an empire, and if he had lived to see the fourth century Thucydides would have had the chance to see how the Spartan oligarchy would manage. The outcome could hardly have been more definite: before scarcely a generation had gone by Sparta was a second rate power, now fearing Thebes rather than bullying her , and begging for an alliance with the Athens whom she had conquered such a short time earlier. Thucydides would have appreciated a parallel with Sparta’s opportunity his own century: in 479 Sparta had spearheaded Greek resistance to the Persians, but subsequently failed to consolidate its position in the eastern Mediterranean, and was replaced as hegemon by Athens. Still, Sparta’s military defeat at the hands of the Thebans must surely have come as a shock, given Sparta’s military reputation. Thucydides might have been all the more surprised that Agisilaus provoked the situation, given the low numbers of Spartiates under his command at this point. This was a tactical error the like of which had not been seen since the Sicilian Expedition .
Sparta’s subsequent inability to recover from defeat would have surprised Thucydides rather less however. He was already aware that Sparta had internal weaknesses linked to the repression of the helot population , having noted that Sparta was subject to “faction” to a degree greater than any other Greek state , and was aware of unrest and the need for severe repression associated with this .
Nor would Thucydides have been surprised by Sparta’s brutality in the years after winning the Peloponnesian War. While the Spartans did not destroy Athens, under Lysandros it presided over the violent institution of decarchies. Sparta’s rapid alienation of her allies before the Corinthian War paralleled the years before the resumption of conflict in 418 . She then made self-interested use of the principle of autonomy under the King’s Peace , and would subsequently launch unprovoked attacks on both the Piraeus and Thebes. Thucydides would no doubt see these events, (not to mention the Spartans’ earlier abandonment of the Greek poleis in Asia Minor) as justification for his sceptical assessment that the Spartans merely “posed as liberators” and also his negative assessment of the Spartan character, in particular the idea that they were unable to control themselves when aboard . We can however be quite confident that Thucydides would not have linked Sparta’s brutality with its subsequent decline. Contrast Xenophon who lived through Sparta’s decline, and who takes a moralistic approach explicitly stating that Sparta’s defeat at Leuktra was a punishment for its impiety .
The fourth century saw the revival but ultimate defeat of the Athenian empire, the central preoccupation of Thucydides writings . Imperial Athens was extensively praised in Pericles’ funeral oration , and some authors argue that Thucydides shared this normal Athenian perspective , given his admiration of Pericles (a great imperialist) himself , and a man who would “decide what had to be done” (ta deonta) . Thinking about Athens’ much desired revival of arche in the form of the Second Naval Confederacy, Thucydides would no doubt have noted its difference to the fifth century version, not least in terms of the Synedrion organising its own tax collection. Nonetheless the fact of Athens’ revival may well have caused Thucydides to call into question a number of different aspects of his assessment of the fifth century. First, while Thucydides informs us from the outset of his narrative that he feels the war will be a “great” one , the sheer fact of the Athenian revival indicates that the outcome of the Peloponnesian War was not definitive . Archidamus was correct to predict that the war was one that the Athenians would bequeath to their sons . Secondly, Thucydides blamed Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War on the moral decline , private interests and greed (pleonexia) of populist Athenian politicians particularly during the 420s . While they may or may not have been responsible, the fact that Athens rose again only to fall again suggests that the generation of the 420s did not bear sole responsibility. A final point: although very probably disappointed at Athens’ decline , Thucydides may well have drawn some consolation from Pericles’ organic understanding of empire, that “everything born is destined to decay” .
Thucydides would have given the resilience of Athens’ reinstated democracy some grudging acknowledgement. Although Thucydides admired Pericles , Thucydides was not a democrat himself, preferring a moderate restrictive oligarchy (contrast e.g. Critias) , and talking wistfully of the “ancient simplicity” of aristocratic rule . However he would have to give credit to the stability that democracy had produced, particularly after Athens’ experience of stasis in 404, and in light of the fact that stasis and tyranny became more common throughout Greece during this troubled period . However he might have noted that its fourth century form was less radical – less democratic (and so less volatile) - than the version espoused by Pericles. Considering Athens’ demise, however, Thucydides might argue that an oligarchy – with adequate leadership - would have responded more effectively to the concerns repeatedly raised by Demosthenes’ regarding the ambitions of Philip II.
A second Thucididyean theme is that of military developments. First, the increasing use of mercenaries, by which term is meant full-time professional soldiers, as opposed to the traditional farmer hoplites. Thucydides had been aware of the astonishing 13000 Greek mercenaries assembled to assist Cyrus in 401 . Just as Persian money had helped to make mercenaries more important during the Peloponnesian War, it would underpin their increasing use in fourth century Greece , not least in internal strife . Secondly, the increasing use of more versatile light-armed troops (peltasts). As Thucydides appreciated these were occasionally used in the fifth century , but their potential was to be fully realised in the fourth . Thirdly, new battlefield formations. The Theban phalanx used to defeat the Spartans at Leuktra was fifty ranks deep in places, and as a hostage in Thebes Philip II was able to learn from their tactics and adapt them to his subsequent advantage. Fourthly, the fourth century the development of a rift between politicians and generals that Thucydides had noted in the fifth century . Fifthly, at Leuktra the elite “Sacred Band” astonishingly demonstrated that it was no longer just the Spartans who were strong on land , and Philip was yet to come. Thucydides might also have noted a number of similarities. Tactically, Sparta’s campaigning in the Boiotian war was similar to its annual invasions of Attica during the Archidamian War . Most fundamentally, naval power was as important as ever , not least given the recurrent exploitation of Athens’ strategic vulnerability at the Hellespont.
Finally, Thucydides would have been interested to see how his views on the nature of states’ interactions applied in the fourth century. Thucydides is often associated with the “realist” view that states are eternally pitted in an amoral power struggle, ethical considerations being set to once side . Certainly the fourth century throws up a number of extremely pragmatic political arrangements, not least Athens’ extension of an alliance to the old enemy, Sparta, in 369 when both were concerned by Theban power. Secondly, Thucydides may have noted that his theory of political causation is nicely demonstrated by the precipitating causes of the Corinthian war; the triviality of the enduring land dispute between the Phokians and the Locrians clearly being a mere pretext for a war the truest cause of which was alarm at Spartan expansionism .
Thucydides would have noted that by the first half of the fourth century the Persians had become a constant factor in inter-Greek affairs. During the fifth century the Persians had moved from being the enemy of all Greece to being the ally of Sparta against Athens. By the fourth century the Persians were conditionally supporting (or threatening to support) one side or the other, and also organising “peace negotiations” . The accusation of “medizing” had lost its early fifth century sting . While Panhellenic idealists like Isokrates urged a crusade against the barbarians , most Greeks lived in a more pragmatic world, one that Thucydides would have recognised. This raises an interesting question: would the extent and obviousness of Persian involvement in the Greek world of the fourth century have caused Thucydides to reassess their involvement in the fifth? It is widely acknowledged that Thucydides neglected the all-important Persian factor in the war , that he consistently underplayed Athens’ relations with Persia, and that the Spartan alliance with Persia remained unexplained . It is possible that if Thucydides had seen the events of the fourth century he might have further altered his views to acknowledge the key role that Persian gold had to play in Athenian defeat , and also paid more general attention to the development of Persian relations with the Greeks .
A similar point can be made about Athenian finances, one of the “astonishing gaps and silences” in Thucydides’ fifth century work . It has been suggested that Thucydides viewed such matters as being beneath him . However in the fourth century Athens’ reduced financial position had severe military implications, one example being during the Social War when Chares was so short of funds that he needed to hire out his troops to a Persian satrap . This level of impact in the fourth century, in conjunction with new procedural developments in this area , might have caused Thucydides to give this topic more attention when writing about the fifth .
Having spent many years writing an exceptionally detailed account of “the greatest war of all” , Thucydides may have been somewhat surprised that scarcely a generation later its two main protagonists had been conquered by the Macedonians, a people who had hitherto been largely unknown. Philip’s extraordinary achievements, from such inauspicious beginnings, might have caused Thucydides to further reflect on the impact that an individual can have on history, and also on the rapidity of change. A second aspect of the surprise is that Sparta’s moment of truth came not at the hands of this new external force, but rather at the hands of the Thebans, to whom they had been laying waste not a decade earlier. Considering the fourth century in the light of the fifth, Thucydides might well have had one overriding impression: that of the sheer quantity of war and disorder that the region had experienced. The destruction of the Peloponnesian War and the chaotic decades that followed it had left the Greeks exhausted as well as disunited, and therefore vulnerable a strong leader who would effect the enormous changes that occurred in their world during the fourth century.
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